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Summer of 1995 was a year for the record books in Hermiston, 
a small farming community in Oregon famous for its watermelons.1 
Those old enough for memories will not forget the major hailstorm 
that hit. It was brief, only fifteen minutes, and left no fatalities.2 But 
the local crops were a complete loss, most notably the famous 
watermelons, and damages were in the tens of millions of dollars.3 
The storm was significant enough to cause many small family 
farms to go under. Fifth-generation farmer Brian Wolfe lost all his 
crops in fifteen minutes. In his words: 
[W]e had that catastrophic event, and it was life-changing. I went 
from operating a farm of—being [sic] able to take some risk . . . to 
minimizing the risk. So after that, I didn’t raise any more potatoes, 
myself. . . . And some of those other high-expensive crops that 
you can, if you get it you can do pretty good, and if you don’t, why, 
there’s always next year, but I didn’t feel like I had next year.  
 . . . [I]t changed the way I operated ‘til up to today’s times.4 
Natural disasters hit farms hard.5 With a commodity that relies 
on weather to succeed, a natural disaster can be devastating. In the 
United States, agricultural losses from disasters in 2017 were esti-
mated at around $5.7 billion.6 Approximately 53% of the nation’s 
 
 1. Oregon’s Top 10 Weather Events of the 1900s, W. REG’L CLIMATE CTR., https:// 
wrcc.dri.edu/Climate/extremes_or.php#top7 (last visited Oct. 17, 2018). 
 2. Bryan Wolfe Oral Interview Video: A Fifth-Generation Farmer and Rancher, OR. ST. U. 
SESQUICENTENNIAL ORAL HIST. PROJECT (Oct. 31, 2014, 1:30 PM), http://scarc.library.oregon 
state.edu/oh150/wolfe/video-wolfe.html (interview by Chris Petersen). 
 3. See Oregon’s Top 10 Weather Events of the 1900s, supra note 1. 
 4. Bryan Wolfe Oral Interview Video, supra note 2. 
 5. For the purposes of this Note I will use the USDA definition of farm: “A farm is 
defined as any place from which $1,000 or more of agricultural products were produced and 
sold, or normally would have been sold, during the year.” Glossary, ECON. RESEARCH SERV., 
https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-economy/farm-household-well-being/glossary 
/#farm (last updated Nov. 30, 2018). “’Agricultural products’ means agricultural, horticul-
tural, viticultural, and dairy products, livestock and the products thereof, the products of 
poultry and bee raising, the edible products of forestry, and any and all products raised or 
produced on farms and processed or manufactured products thereof, transported or intend-
ed to be transported in interstate and/or foreign commerce.” 7 U.S.C.A. § 451 (West 2018). 
Though I reference horticulture farmers frequently, other agricultural products and 
producers are also included in the analysis. 
 6. Sam Bloch, 2017’s Natural Disasters Cost American Agriculture Over $5 Billion, NEW 
FOOD ECON. (Jan. 4, 2018), https://newfoodeconomy.org/2017-natural-disasters-agricul 
ture-damage-5-billion/. 
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sugar production was affected by natural disasters.7 Puerto Rico 
lost approximately 80% of its crop value. The island also suffered 
an estimated $1.8 billion in losses to its critical agricultural infra-
structure.8 Although 2017 was a record year for natural disasters, 
the estimate is useful to highlight how much agriculture is affected 
by natural disasters. 
Farmers are well aware of their reliance on weather and the 
lasting impact of natural disasters9 on their livelihood, but most 
lawmakers do not understand the significant consequences of 
disasters on farmers’ lives. There is minimal government disaster 
aid for farmers after disasters.10 The majority of states have no 
programs in place to protect farmers after disasters, so existing 
financial support is federally funded.11 Federal Crop Insurance 
(FCI) and federal disaster relief bills, the main options, do not 
adequately cover the losses.12 For example, of the $81 billion in 
emergency funds approved in December 2017 by the House to 
provide relief after Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, as well as 
various 2017 wildfires, only $2.6 billion was reserved for losses to 
the agricultural sector.13 This amounts to less than half of estimated 
damages. Some farmers may have financial help if insured under 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. (estimating the value of damaged storage facilities, irrigation systems, fences, 
and other agricultural infrastructure). 
 9. For the purposes of this Note, natural disasters is defined by the FEMA standard 
set in the Stafford Act for major disasters, namely, “any natural catastrophe (including any 
hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, winddriven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, 
volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless of cause, any 
fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the determination of the 
President causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster 
assistance under the Stafford Act to supplement the efforts and available resources of States, 
local governments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hard-
ship, or suffering caused thereby.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 5122 (West 2018); see also 6 U.S.C.A. § 313 
(West 2018). 
 10. See infra Part I. 
 11. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-2a (West 2018) (Emergency Management Act, 
providing no disaster relief for farms in emergency response statutes); Farmer Resource 
Network Online Directory, FARM AID, https://www.farmaid.org/our-work/resources-for-
farmers/farmer-resource-network/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2018). Extensive searching in state 
codes and Farm Aid’s online disaster search tool yielded no results for state-
funded programs. 
 12. See infra Part I. 
 13. H.R. 4667, 115th Cong. (2017). 
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federal programs, but coverage is limited, and damages can cause 
years of financial loss.14  
Natural disasters affect small family farms differently than 
large corporate farms. Financial losses from disasters can be ab-
sorbed by large corporate farms because they can more easily 
distribute risk. Unfortunately, small family farms often fall by the 
wayside. On small family farms the “operator and family provide[] 
over half the labor, management, and equity capital.”15 These farms 
typically engage in more “localized, small-scale, agricultural oper-
ations.”16 The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
divides small family farms into three main groups: (1) farms with 
an operator who has a primary occupation other than farming; 
(2) farms with an operator whose primary occupation is farming 
(these include farms of low sales, less than $150,000, and moderate 
sales, $150,000 to $349,000); and (3) retirement farms.17 Within the 
context of this Note, small family farms generally refers to the second 
type, those with gross cash farm income less than $350,000 per year. 
This category of farms comprises 90% of all U.S. farms.18 These are 
high-risk ventures.19 Typically, farmers go into debt in the spring 
for a payoff in the fall. They operate with small profit margins that 
are susceptible to significant loss from a variety of factors, 
including natural disasters. 
 
 14. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N. DIRECTOR-GENERAL, 2017: THE IMPACT OF 
DISASTERS AND CRISES ON AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY, at x (2018) (“Disasters impact 
agriculture beyond the short-term. The sector often endures long-lasting and multi-pronged 
consequences such as loss of harvest and livestock, outbreaks of disease, and destruction of 
rural infrastructure and irrigation systems.”). 
 15. Luther Tweeten, Agricultural Industrialization: For Better or Worse? 2 (The Ohio 
State Univ. Dep’t of Agric., Envtl., & Dev. Econ., Anderson Chair Occasional Paper ESO  
#2404, 1998). 
 16. J. Michael Boomershine, Jr., Note, The Battle over America’s Farmlands: Corporate 
Farming Practices and Legislative Attempts at Preserving the Family Farm, 21 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 
361, 363 (2016). 
 17. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ACH 12-34, 2012 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE HIGHLIGHTS: 
SMALL FARMS 1, 2 (2016) [hereinafter 2012 CENSUS SMALL FARM HIGHLIGHTS]. 
 18. Distribution of Farms and Value of Production Vary by Farm Type, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. 
ECON. RESEARCH SERV., https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/chart-gallery/gallery 
/chart-detail/?chartId=58288 (last updated Nov. 29, 2017). 
 19. ROBERT A. HOPPE, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH SERV., EIB-132, 
STRUCTURE AND FINANCES OF U.S. FARMS: FAMILY FARM REPORT, 2014 EDITION 38–40 (2014) 
[hereinafter 2014 FAMILY FARM REPORT]. 
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Corporate farms are better equipped to survive natural 
disasters than small family farms. Corporate farms are large-scale 
farming operations that engage in corporate practices such as verti-
cal integration, factory farming, factory production, and “other 
practices consistent with corporate culture.”20 These operations 
tend to have higher profits and returns because they produce mass 
quantities, thus lowering overall production costs per outcome 
unit.21 As a recent USDA study of farm structure concluded, “larger 
farms utilize labor and capital more intensively, which provide 
them with the primary source of their financial advantage.”22 
Therefore, while 88% of all farms in the United States are small 
family farms, they comprise only 5% of the country’s net farm 
income.23 For these reasons, small family farms are more vulnerable 
to insuperable financial loss when a natural disaster strikes. How-
ever, federal disaster aid does not differentiate between small 
family farms and corporate farms when providing assistance. Re-
search indicates the federal support given to small family farms 
tends to be inadequate and natural disasters often result in bank-
ruptcy or occupation change, as illustrated by Brian Wolfe’s story 
in the opening paragraph.24 But, is this something the government 
should remedy? 
This Note offers an examination of the issues surrounding small 
family farms when natural disasters strike and assesses what role, 
if any, the government should play in protecting these entities in 
disasters. I posit that small family farms fill a vital role in sustaining 
communities and protecting from future disaster loss. This Note 
argues that the federal government should amend farm disaster aid 
to protect this subset of farms. Part I provides an overview of cur-
rent federal support for farms in a disaster. Part II highlights the 
needs of small family farms in disasters as compared with corpo-
rate farms and how small family farms suffer disproportionately 
more losses in disasters. Part III provides an analysis of risks in de-
ciding whether it is a fiscally responsible choice for the government 
 
 20. Boomershine, supra note 16, at 363–64. 
 21. Tweeten, supra note 15, at 2–4. 
 22. JAMES M. MACDONALD ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH SERV., ERR-
152, FARM SIZE AND THE ORGANIZATION OF U.S. CROP FARMING, at iv (2013). 
 23. 2012 CENSUS SMALL FARM HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 17, at 1. 
 24. See infra Part I; Part IV. 
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to provide more financial support and protection to family farms in 
natural disasters. Part IV offers possible legislative solutions to 
provide more support for small family farms without promoting 
risk-inducing behaviors and subsidizing bad farming practices. 
This comprehensive evaluation demonstrates that while small 
family farms do not play a large role as market suppliers, they 
contribute in other ways that merit greater disaster protection by 
the federal government. 
I. UNDERSTANDING ACCESS TO FEDERAL DISASTER AID FOR FARMS 
Federal disaster aid has become a significant survival tool for 
farmers yet fails to adequately support small family farms. Disaster 
assistance to farmers has undergone major revisions since the 
program was initially established. Despite the development of 
disaster aid, it has not managed to adjust to the changing 
landscape of farm producers, so small family farms are often left 
without protection. 
A. Federal Crop Insurance Program 
Crop disaster aid began in response to public need, and its 
adaptations continue to reflect that approach. The first federal 
approach to farming disaster aid was in the late 1930s with the 
Federal Crop Insurance Act.25 Initially created as an experiment “to 
help agriculture recover from the combined effects of the Great 
Depression and the Dust Bowl,” the program was entirely govern-
ment run through the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC), 
and insurance coverage was limited to major crops in high produc-
tion areas.26 Because of this, enrollment numbers were low and 
producers relied on other tools to manage risk.27 
 
 25. David F. Rendahl, Comment, Federal Crop Insurance: Friend or Foe?, 4 SAN JOAQUIN 
AGRIC. L. REV. 185, 185–86 (1994). 
 26. The Basics of Crop Insurance, PRO AG, https://www.proag.com/basics-of-crop 
-insurance/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2018). 
 27. ERIK J. O’DONOGHUE, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH SERV., ERR-169, THE 
EFFECTS OF PREMIUM SUBSIDIES ON DEMAND FOR CROP INSURANCE (2014). 
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1. 1980 federal crop insurance reform 
Throughout the mid-twentieth century the need for increased 
risk protection grew, and Federal Crop Insurance turned from an 
unreliable experiment to a legitimate program in 1980. Legislators 
recognized that financial protection was necessary because farming 
is a high-risk venture that serves a national interest.28 The goal was 
to expand the role of governmental support for privately owned 
crops and “promote the national welfare by improving the eco-
nomic stability of agriculture through a sound system of crop insur-
ance.”29 Thus, Federal Crop Insurance expanded to cover more 
crops and regions and enlisted private insurers through rein-
surance agreements.30  
Prior to 1980, farmers purchased crop insurance directly from 
the FCIC.31 Due to advances in the private insurance industry, 
the 1980 amendments authorized the FCIC to enter into reinsur-
ance agreements with private insurers, consequently cutting 
administrative costs and expanding availability.32 Although the 
1980 amendments increased the number of insurable commodities 
and made insurance available in additional regions, the program 
did not achieve the levels of participation Congress anticipated.33 
 
 28. H.R. REP. NO. 96-430, at 8–9 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3068, 3071. The 
legislative history states, 
  Agricultural producers are involved in a high risk pursuit both in terms of 
debilitating economic swings and the vagaries of natural phenomenon. . . . ‘[H]ip 
pocket’ financing has largely been replaced with farming operations which are 
highly capitalized and which operate on borrowed funds. . . . Relying to such a 
large extent on borrowed funds accentuates the financial damage which occurs 
when drought, flood, insects, disease, or other natural disaster strikes a farmer’s 
crop. In a matter of days or even hours a natural disaster can wreak financial ruin 
on an individual farmer or perhaps an entire rural community. . . . The seriousness 
of the need of providing financial protection to farmers should not be under-
estimated. Congress has recognized this necessity and adopted programs to 
address it. 
Id.  
 29. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1502(a) (West 2014). 
 30. Rendahl, supra note 25, at 193–94 n.62. 
 31. Id. 
 32. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1508(a)(1) (West 2018); An Act to Improve and Expand the Federal 
Crop Insurance Program, Pub. L. No. 96-365, 94 Stat. 1312 (1980). 
 33. The Basics of Crop Insurance, supra note 26. Low demand can be attributed to a vari-
ety of possible factors: “[(1)] Insurance can become unattractive when expected losses and 
required premiums become high in relation to property values. The preferred strategies are 
risk avoidance and loss mitigation. [(2)] There is less willingness to insure, because there is 
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Despite increased availability of crop insurance, enrollment re-
mained low and government costs increased, prompting Congress 
to further amend Federal Crop Insurance to increase participation. 
Costs were prohibitive for most farmers and payouts did not ade-
quately cover losses.34 
Then, major drought in the 1980s led to a succession of bills for 
ad hoc disaster assistance to farmers (1988, 1989, 1992, 1993).35 
These bills provided one-time financial relief to farmers suffering 
from disaster-related crop losses but provided no long-term 
solution.36 However, “Congress grew tired of these repeated 
requests.”37 This prompted the 1994 Reform Act, which required 
farmers to participate in Federal Crop Insurance to be eligible for 
certain types of disaster payments.38 This mandatory participation 
requirement proved widely unpopular and was subsequently 
repealed in 1996.39 
2. 1996 federal crop insurance reform 
Through the 1996 Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act, 
Congress attempted to provide support to farmers in disasters 
while continuing to strive for efficient risk management. The Act 
created the “Risk Management Agency” (formerly the FCIC) to 
administer disaster funds to farmers through the Federal Crop 
Insurance (FCI) program as well as the newly created Non-insured 
Crop Disaster Assistance Program (NAP).40 With different eligi-
bility requirements, the goal was for FCI and NAP to complement 
each other and provide disaster support to all farmers.41 
 
less uncertainty, when losses are expected to be frequent but of modest size in relation to 
property values. . . . [(3)] Consumers may be reluctant to pay high premium loadings to 
insure potentially large but rare disaster losses. [(4)] Some parties may be naturally hedged 
against certain losses. Many farmers, for example, are partially hedged against crop losses 
from bad weather because lower yields reduce supply and therefore tend to raise prices.” 
Scott E. Harrington, Rethinking Disaster Policy, 23 REG. 40, 43 (2000). 
 34. Rendahl, supra note 25, at 187. 
 35. History of the Crop Insurance Program, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. RISK MGMT. AGENCY, 
https://legacy.rma.usda.gov/aboutrma/what/history.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2018). 
 36. Id. 
 37. The Basics of Crop Insurance, supra note 26. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-127 (1996). 
 40. Id. 
 41. See discussion infra Sections I.A.2.a–b. 
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Nevertheless, FCI coverage is limited to specific crops in qualifying 
areas; thus many small family farmers do not qualify.42 While NAP 
was intended to fill the gap, the financial support is insufficient to 
sustain a small farmer after disaster wipes out the crops or stock. 
Even with the two options, small family farms are still left without 
federal support after a disaster. 
a. Risk Management Agency. The Risk Management Agency 
(RMA) was given statutory authority to contract and partner with 
private-sector insurance agencies and distribute FCI. As with the 
1980s amendments, these contracts allow private providers to offer 
premiums subsidized by the government through reinsurance.43 
Under RMA, there was an increase in authority given to contract 
with the private sector, which allowed for increased cost-cutting 
measures and expanded availability.44 The subsidized premiums 
did increase FCI enrollment,45 but even with subsidized premiums, 
as of 2011 an overwhelming 78% of U.S. farms had no crop insur-
ance coverage.46  
 Minimal enrollment numbers mean that, rather than running as 
a typical insurance program where participants subsidize enroll-
ment for each other, the government must continue to subsidize 
premiums to keep the program running. Currently, the federal 
government subsidizes the premiums at an average of 62%.47 But 
most of this money is subsidizing the insurance premiums of large 
corporate farms because such farms represent the largest enrollers 
in FCI.48 
b. Non-insured Crop Disaster Assistance Program. Non-insured Crop 
Disaster Assistance is the other main source of funds distributed by 
 
 42. Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-127, 
§ 194–96 (1996). 
 43. Id. 
 44. 7 U.S.C.A. § 7333 (West 2018). 
 45. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45193, FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE: PROGRAM OVERVIEW 
FOR THE 115TH CONGRESS 5 (2018) [hereinafter FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE PROGRAM OVER-
VIEW 2018]. 
 46. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. RISK MGMT. AGENCY, THE RISK MANAGEMENT SAFETY NET: 
PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS—MARKET PENETRATION AND POTENTIAL 5 (2013) [hereinafter USDA 
MARKET PENETRATION ANALYSIS]. 
 47. FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE PROGRAM OVERVIEW 2018, supra note 45, at 14. 
 48. ANTON BEKKERMAN ET AL., AM. ENTER. INST., WHERE THE MONEY GOES: THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF CROP INSURANCE AND OTHER FARM SUBSIDY PAYMENTS 4–10 (Jan. 2018), 
http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Where-the-Money-Goes.pdf. 
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RMA for farmers in disasters, but it also fails to provide compre-
hensive coverage. NAP “was created to provide crop loss assistance 
to producers who are unable to obtain federal crop insurance for a 
particular crop.”49 NAP offers only catastrophic insurance cover-
age.50 To receive a payout, farmers must suffer a “yield or inventory 
value loss greater than [50%,]” and coverage is only offered at up 
to 65% of the approved yield.51 NAP is offered as a stopgap to fill 
the hole for crops that are ineligible for FCI. But its limited coverage 
does not provide much support for small family farms. If a small 
family farm suffers a loss greater than 50% yet can only receive a 
payment to cover 65% of its possible yield, this will likely be 
insufficient to sustain the farm’s livelihood. Approximately 70% of 
small family farms operate with a less than 10% profit margin.52 
Thus, while NAP is a valiant effort to provide support, it re-
mains insufficient. 
3. Current concerns 
Federal Crop Insurance reform efforts have consistently sought 
to increase participation but failed to account for the changing 
makeup of farmers. Farm size has doubled in the last thirty years 
as corporate farming has taken over.53 Crop insurance coverage is 
only offered for large commodity crops and in certain counties, 
depending on the percentage of land used for agriculture within a 
county. 54 Under current RMA standards, large corporate farms 
 
 49. KAREN R. KRUB ET AL., FARMERS’ GUIDE TO DISASTER ASSISTANCE 4-1 (6th ed. 2008). 
 50. Id. 
 51. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NONINSURED CROP DISASTER ASSISTANCE PROGRAM APPLI-
CATION FOR COVERAGE (2018), https://www.fsa.usda.gov/Internet/FSA_File/ccc0471_nap 
_bp_140813v01.pdf. 
 52. 2014 FAMILY FARM REPORT, supra note 19, at 39. 
 53. MACDONALD, supra note 22, at ii–iii (“Although most cropland was operated by 
farms with less than 600 crop acres in the early 1980s, today most cropland is on farms with 
at least 1,100 acres, and many farms are 5 and 10 times that size. . . . [L]arger farms utilize 
labor and capital more intensively, which provide them with the primary source of their 
financial advantage.”). 
 54. USDA MARKET PENETRATION ANALYSIS, supra note 46, at 8. These commodity 
crops include corn, cotton, rice, soybeans, wheat, livestock, and poultry. They are covered 
by the Federal Crop Insurance because they can be easily traded, stored for a long time, and 
grown in large quantities at low costs. This is partly why industrial farms produce these 
crops. See Melanie J. Wender, Comment, Goodbye Family Farms and Hello Agribusiness: The 
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almost always qualify because the acreage of their operations meets 
the county agricultural land-use requirements and over 80% of 
their income is earned from large commodity crops.55 On the other 
hand, small family farms are more likely to grow niche products 
not covered by crop insurance.56 Additionally, small farmers do not 
farm in isolated locations, as do corporate farms.57 Because the 
farmers live where they work, they farm in areas that are more 
populated and less likely to be counties covered by crop insur-
ance.58 Therefore, a large portion of the uninsured farms are small 
family farms.59 Ad hoc disaster assistance used to be an option for 
small farmers, but with the emergence of FCI and NAP this help has 
largely disappeared, leaving small farmers with no post-disaster 
recovery help.60 
As one of the government’s costliest programs, FCI is con-
stantly targeted for cuts and reform.61 The changing landscape of 
farming in America and the evolving understanding of disaster risk 
factors necessitate reform. However, current calls for reform have 
largely neglected one of the most important issues: whether, and 
how, current farm relief adequately protects small family farms in 
the aftermath of natural disasters. This is a critical problem the next 
 
Story of How Agricultural Policy Is Destroying the Family Farm and the Environment, 22 VILL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 141, 143 (2011). 
 55. MARY BOHMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH SERV., APN-078, AG AND 
FOOD STATISTICS: CHARTING THE ESSENTIALS (Oct. 2017). 
 56. There are a variety of reasons for this. Environmentally, commodity crops drain 
the soil more than other fruits and vegetables, and small family farms reuse their same land 
over and over. Fruits and vegetables, while riskier, have larger profit margins. For a more 
thorough discussion see Jessica Fanzo, From Big to Small: The Significance of Smallholder Farms 
in the Global Food System, LANCET PLANETARY HEALTH, Apr. 2017, at e15; see also Wender, 
supra note 54, at 143. 
 57. See MACDONALD, supra note 22, at 8 (“[Consolidated corporate] crop fields are 
more likely to be large and contiguous to one another, rather than scattered among other 
land uses.”). 
 58. See Wender, supra note 54, at 144. Corporate farms tend to operate in isolated areas 
that are exclusively farmland and thus qualify for coverage. Id. Small family farmers tend to 
own land closer to communities in order to access other amenities. Id. 
 59. See USDA MARKET PENETRATION ANALYSIS, supra note 46, at 15. 
 60. Joshua D. Woodard & Scott Marlow, Crop Insurance, Credit, and Conservation (Point 
of View Working Paper, commissioned by AGree, Apr. 2017), http://www.foodandagpolicy 
.org/sites/default/files/Crop%20Insurance%20Credit%20and%20Conservation.pdf. 
 61. FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE PROGRAM OVERVIEW 2018, supra note 45, at 21 (“Given 
the program’s significant cost and share of USDA program outlays, it is a frequent target for 
budgetary savings.”). 
 
GOUGH_AA (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/19  8:30 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2018 
904 
section demonstrates by highlighting the many ways that small 
family farms suffer disproportionately in disasters. 
II. DISPARATE IMPACT OF DISASTERS ON SMALL FAMILY FARMS 
Small family farms suffer disproportionately more losses in 
disasters. “[W]ealth and income are more unequally distributed 
among farmers than in society as a whole, and . . . poverty is 
common among farmers.”62 About 75% of farmers in poverty work 
small family farms.63 This subset of farmers is more vulnerable to 
loss before disaster strikes. Further, other factors such as higher 
overhead costs, limited access to legal help, and lifestyle harms 
expose this population to other dangers in the event of disaster. The 
combination of these factors increases the likelihood that a small 
family farm will not recover when a natural disaster hits. 
A. Financial Loss 
Small family farms suffer devastating financial losses from 
disasters in ways that larger farms do not. Small farms are costlier 
to run.64 “Larger crop farms perform better financially, on average, 
than smaller farms.”65 The differences reflect lower costs per unit of 
production.”66 While the operating costs and revenue are about the 
same for large and small farms, “larger operations appear to be able 
to apply their labor and capital to more acres than smaller farms.”67 
Because larger operations spread their costs across more acres, the 
more acres a farm is, the more profitable it is.68 For these reasons, 
small farms operate with a smaller profit margin, and a loss from a 
disaster can be much more devastating on small farms than 
large ones. 
 
 62. Stephen Carpenter, Family Farm Advocacy and Rebellious Lawyering, 24 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 79, 81 (2017). 
 63. 2014 FAMILY FARM REPORT, supra note 19, at iii–iv. 
 64. Id. at 35–41. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
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Current policies governing federal disaster aid favor larger 
farmers over small farms.69 Federal subsidies for crop insurance 
premiums are not adjusted by size of purchaser.70 Farmers receive 
62% in subsidies for premiums, regardless of whether the farmer 
makes $1,000,000,000 or $100,000.71 Since small farms have smaller 
operating budgets, their insurance payments will comprise a larger 
portion of the budget. Further, crop insurance disaster payments 
are based on production and have no cap.72 “The more ‘base acres’ 
available to a farmer, the more payments are available.”73 Most 
farm programs restrict payments to farmers with an adjusted gross 
income above $900,000 over three years,74 but no such limits exist 
for crop insurance.75 Additionally, as with other types of insurance, 
farmers choose the amount of coverage their crops receive, which 
 
 69. Christopher R. Kelley, Rethinking the Equities of Federal Farm Programs, 14 N. ILL. U. 
L. REV. 659, 670 (2016). 
 70. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-356, CROP INSURANCE: REDUCING 
SUBSIDIES FOR HIGHEST INCOME PARTICIPANTS COULD SAVE FEDERAL DOLLARS WITH MINIMAL 
EFFECT ON THE PROGRAM 2–3 (Mar. 18, 2015) (analyzing government reforms to make pro-
gram more efficient). 
 71. Id. 
 72. See Gary Schnitkey et al., Farm Sizes Impacted by a $40,000 Crop Insurance Premium 
Support Limit, FARMDOC DAILY (Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Econ., Univ. of Ill. at Urbana-
Champaign) 1 (Feb. 6, 2018), https://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018 
/02/fdd060218.pdf (discussing proposals for payment caps). 
 73. Kelley, supra note 69, at 670. 
 74. Ron Durst & Robert Williams, Farm Bill Income Cap for Program Payment Eligibility 
Affects Few Farms, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ECON. RES. SERV. (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.ers.usda 
.gov/amber-waves/2016/august/farm-bill-income-cap-for-program-payment-eligibility-af 
fects-few-farms/. 
 75. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 70, at 2–3. 
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then determines the insurance payment.76 This means if small 
farmers want good coverage they must pay higher subsidies, which 
represents a significantly larger percentage of their operating bud-
get. For these reasons, most small farmers forgo crop insurance.77 
Forgoing insurance leaves small farms susceptible to huge fi-
nancial loss. The lack of adjusted rates for crop insurance means the 
cost is more prohibitive for small farmers. Furthermore, crop insur-
ance policies provide coverage almost exclusively on a per-crop 
basis,78 “which suits industrial farms growing single crops on vast 
acreage.”79 Since small farms tend to grow more of a variety of 
crops, crop insurance enrollment is challenging and complicated, 
sometimes requiring multiple policies.80 “As a result, few small farms 
take out insurance plans, leaving them vulnerable to risks like 
extreme weather and hard-pressed to secure credit and loans.”81 
Having no insurance means small farmers can suffer three 
types of financial losses after a disaster. The first two losses are the 
lack of income due to crop damage and the lack of an insurance 
 
 76. FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE PROGRAM OVERVIEW 2018, supra note 45, at 8–11. 
 
Id. 
 77. 2014 FAMILY FARM REPORT, supra note 19, at 39. Sixty-nine percent of midsize family 
farms purchase crop insurance and 73% of large farms do. Id. at 33. In contrast, only about 
17% of small family farms participate in Federal Crop Insurance. Id. 
 78. See 7 U.S.C.A. § 1508(a) (West 2018). 
 79. Dylan Walsh, Big Risks for Uninsured Farmers, N.Y. TIMES: GREEN (May 22, 2012, 
1:38 PM), https://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/22/big-risks-for-uninsured-farmers/. 
See JONATHAN R. MCFADDEN & ROBERT A. HOPPE, EIB-184, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ECON. 
RESEARCH SERV., EVOLVING DISTRIBUTION OF PAYMENTS FROM COMMODITY, CONSERVATION, 
AND FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE PROGRAMS 29 (Nov. 2017). 
 80. See Walsh, supra note 79. 
 81. Id.; 2014 FAMILY FARM REPORT, supra note 19, at 39. 
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coverage payout. The final loss comes from other security interests 
used as payment in place of lost income. Unlike large corporate 
farms, small farmers have little in liquid assets and typically rely 
on lending institutions to provide capital in the spring for planting 
costs.82 Most lenders “either require or consider crop insurance of 
borrowers in making loan decisions.”83 If a lender is willing to take 
a risk on a small farmer without crop insurance, the loan will 
require other types of collateral because interest rates are already 
“high enough to be limited by state usury laws.”84 Hence, nonprice 
methods are the lender’s only viable alternatives to manage risk; 
these methods include security interest in crop, security interest in 
machinery, lien on real estate, and lien on life insurance.85 When a 
natural disaster hits, small family farmers have no income from the 
crop or insurance and lose whatever collateral was used to finance 
the planting of the crop, such as their house, their life insurance, 
necessary machinery, etc.86 Bankruptcy is common in these situa-
tions. This is why farmers have their own Chapter Twelve bank-
ruptcy, separate from other sectors, that includes special protec-
tions to deal with the financial concerns they face.87 All small 
farmers have their own story, or know people personally who have 
lost their house, life insurance, and more after a disaster hits.88 
The losses small farms suffer from natural disasters can mean 
both short- and long-term ruin. The disparity of income received 
per field, crop insurance inequalities, and financing difficulties are 
all contributing factors. Because these factors do not exist for large 
farms, when disaster hits, small farms are hurt to the point 
of collapse. 
 
 82. See Peter J. Barry et al., Farmers’ Credit Risks and Liquidity Management, 63 AM. J. 
AGRIC. ECON. 216, 220 (1981). 
 83. Woodard & Marlow, supra note 60, at 1. 
 84. Barry, supra note 82, at 222. 
 85. See id. at 220–21. 
 86. These harms also contribute to other societal harms discussed later. See generally 
infra Part II.C. 
 87. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1201–31 (West 2015). 
 88. Telephone Interview with John Lloyd, Owner, SandHollow Enters. & NW Farm 
Supply (Mar. 4, 2018) (on file with author) (“When the hailstorm hit [in Hermiston, Oregon,] 
the farmer next to me lost his home and life insurance because they were his security on his 
fields. He was a better farmer than me, but nature took it all away.”). 
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B. Legal Help Access 
Legal services post-disaster can help protect farmers from signi-
ficant loss, yet small farmers are less likely to receive legal help. 
Post-disaster, small farmers face “foreclosure and dispossession 
that can involve the loss of their livelihoods, homes, and place in 
the community.”89 A recent study shows that “[d]espite the impor-
tant and complex nature of these legal issues [facing farmers] . . . 
few farmers sought out an attorney’s services.”90 The most common 
reason farmers do not seek legal services is the cost.91 A more 
detailed analysis shows a “positive correlation between gross value 
of sales and the likelihood of hiring an attorney.”92 
Table93 
Percentage of farmers who have an attorney, compared to farm income 
 
Farm income 
Farmers’ main financial resource after a natural disaster is the 
federal government, and yet small farmers are often unable to re-
ceive that assistance because accessing it requires legal skills. When 
asked about their legal concerns, farmers listed understanding 
 
 89. Carpenter, supra note 62, at 82. 
 90. A. Bryan Endres et al., The Legal Needs of Farmers: An Analysis of the Family Farm 
Legal Needs Survey, 71 MONT. L. REV. 135, 135 (2010). 
 91. Id. at 149. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
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federal support programs as the primary issue.94 The federal help 
farmers receive post-disaster is dictated by laws that change from 
year to year.95 Access to this federal aid “can play a significant role 
in the success or failure of a farm [post-disaster].”96 This is a 
problem that disproportionately hurts small farmers because, while 
they would benefit substantially from access to a lawyer, they do 
not have the funds or opportunity to access legal help.97 
Small farmers often struggle to find legal help because of a 
shortage of available legal assistance in their communities. While 
about 20% of the U.S. population lives in rural communities, only 
about 2% of small law practices serve those communities.98 Addi-
tionally, rural communities are marked by a “high density of 
acquaintanceship.”99 The lack of anonymity for lawyers in rural 
communities means they may feel “beholden to local economic 
elites who provide most of their business.”100 Industrial farms are 
the economic elite. Although owners of industrial farms usually do 
not live in the rural communities surrounding the farms, they often 
outsource services from the local communities.101 Consequently, 
even if small farmers decide to seek legal help, they may not find it. 
Advocacy groups provide some legal aid to small family farms, 
but lack of legal help continues to hurt these farmers dispropor-
tionately. Lack of legal aid to small farms is gaining awareness. 
FLAG (Farmers’ Legal Action Group) “was born as a response to 
the farm credit crisis of the 1980s after tens of thousands of families 
lost their farms due to low commodity prices and overwhelming 
 
 94. Id. at 135. 
 95. Carpenter, supra note 62, at 96 (“Farmers are subject to immense variations in law.”). 
 96. Id. at 82. 
 97. Endres et al., supra note 90, at 150. (“[Eighty-three percent] of respondents who 
chose to hire an attorney to deal with their most significant problem reported satisfaction 
with the services received.”). 
 98. Lisa R. Pruitt & Bradley E. Showman, Law Stretched Thin: Access to Justice in Rural 
America, 59 S.D. L. REV. 466, 467 (2014). 
 99. William R. Freudenberg, The Density of Acquaintanceship: An Overlooked Variable in 
Community Research?, 92 AM. J. SOC. 27, 32 (1986); Pruitt & Showman, supra note 98, at 490 
(“Small-firm practice in the country isn’t really all that different than small-firm practice in 
the city. The clients have many of the same problems and you handle a wide variety of mat-
ters. The difference is intimacy. In the country you know everybody and everybody knows 
you. That’s where things start to get different.” (quoting DONALD D. LANDON, COUNTRY 
LAWYERS: THE IMPACT OF CONTEXT ON PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 56 (1990))). 
 100. Pruitt & Showman, supra note 98, at 490. 
 101. Id. at 490–91. 
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debt.”102 Attorneys at FLAG successfully challenged illegal 
procedures “used to freeze farmers’ income and force them off their 
land.”103 FLAG, and other similar groups, focus on reaching small 
family farms that are underserved by the “private bar,” recognizing 
that the private bar “does agricultural law and represents prosper-
ous farmers, agribusiness . . . and large cooperatives . . . . [and] 
often takes an adversarial position to FLAG’s clients, rarely 
represent[ing] poor farmers . . . .”104 Nevertheless, FLAG acknowl-
edges that potential clients’ legal needs overwhelm its capacity to 
represent individuals directly.105 With the notable exception of 
FLAG and a few other similar projects, ongoing legal efforts to 
serve small family farmers have been rare—leaving small farmers 
without critical legal help.106 
C. Lifestyle Harm 
The farming lifestyle inherently creates risks that increase with 
natural disasters and are felt more acutely by small family farms. 
Farmers, along with fishers and those involved in forestry, suffer 
from mental health issues more than any other occupation.107 
“According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
farmers, as a group, have a higher suicide rate than any other 
occupation, even twice as high as vets.”108 Farmers are at risk for a 
number of reasons: job-related isolation, stressful work environ-
ments, work-home imbalance, socioeconomic inequities, lower 
education levels, lack of access to health services, exposure to 
pesticides, potential for financial loss, barriers to mental health 
services, and access to lethal means.109 Many of the risk factors 
 
 102. About Us, FARMERS’ LEGAL ACTION GRP., http://www.flaginc.org/about/ (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2018). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Carpenter, supra note 62, at 94–95. 
 105. Id. at 94 n.51. 
 106. Id. at 94. 
 107. Wendy LiKamWa McIntosh et al., Suicide Rates by Occupational Group—17 States, 
2012, 65 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., 
July 1, 2016, at 641, 641. 
 108. Tovia Smith, As Milk Prices Decline, Worries About Dairy Farmer Suicides Rise, NPR 
(Feb. 27, 2018, 11:31 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/02/27/586586267/as-milk-prices-de 
cline-worries-about-dairy-farmer-suicides-rise. 
 109. McIntosh et al., supra note 107, at 644. 
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increase for operators of small family farms. Add to that the 
helplessness that comes with a natural disaster and not having the 
safety net larger farms do, small family farms lose in a big way. 
Experts say small farmers face a “kind of perfect storm of financial 
pressure and a sense of powerlessness in an industry where prices 
are set by the government,” combined with social isolation and a 
self-reliant spirit that may make them loathe to seek help.110 
The same risk factors that contribute to mental health problems 
in farmers also lead to increased risk of other societal harms. For 
example, intimate partner violence (IPV) rates are much higher in 
small rural and isolated communities.111 Further, “[a]mong women 
who reported physical IPV, the frequency and severity increased 
with increasing rurality.”112 Abuse rates are “strongly linked to 
economic stress” caused by housing issues, such as foreclosure 
concerns, a problem small family farmers often face.113 Rural Amer-
icans are a population that also suffers from “significant health 
disparities . . . when compared to the general population.”114 
“Rural risk factors for health disparities include geographic isola-
tion, lower socio-economic status, . . . and limited job oppor-
tunities.”115 The problem grows when the rural resident is poor and 
does not have employer-provided healthcare coverage.116 Finally, 
 
 110. Smith, supra note 108. 
 111. Corinne Peek-Asa et al., Rural Disparity in Domestic Violence Prevalence and Access 
to Resources, 20 J. WOMEN’S HEALTH 1743, 1745 (2011) (urban women 15.5%, large rural town 
13.3%, small rural town 22%); Wendy Boka, Note, Domestic Violence in Farming Communities: 
Overcoming the Unique Problems Posed by the Rural Setting, 9 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 389, 413 (2004) 
(“Domestic violence is a prevalent problem among rural and farming communities across 
America . . . . The problems that contribute to domestic violence—power and control, 
physical dominance, social gender roles, economic dependence, isolation, and a lack of 
support resources—are present in rural society just as in urban society. However, additional 
barriers affect rural victims of domestic violence. These barriers include geographic isola-
tion, economic structure, social and cultural pressures, and the lack of transportation, child 
care, housing, sufficient police availability and training, and a support system.”). 
 112. Peek-Asa et al., supra note 111. 
 113. Robert Cherry & Chun Wang, The Link Between Male Employment and Child 
Maltreatment in the U.S., 2000–2012, 66 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 117, 118 (2016). 
 114. Rural Health Disparities, RURAL HEALTH INFO. HUB, https://www.ruralhealthinfo 
.org/topics/rural-health-disparities#regions (last visited Nov. 15, 2018). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Jeffrey R. Wakefield, New UVM Study: Health Insurance Costs Threaten Farm Viability, 
UNIV. VT. (July 14, 2017), https://www.uvm.edu/uvmnews/news/new-uvm-study-health 
-insurance-costs-threaten-farm-viability (“According to a new U.S. Department of Agriculture-
funded study, lack of access to affordable health insurance is one of the most significant 
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stress from the rural farming lifestyle, with its attendant financial 
risk and loss, can lead to considerable health issues and increased 
risk of death.117 While not direct causation, small family farms 
suffer from these issues in a way large corporate farms do not due 
to lower income levels, increased financial instability, and less 
structural support. 
Juggling increased financial losses, limited legal help, and 
significant lifestyle harms, small family farms are in a desperate 
situation after a disaster. 
III. EVALUATING RISK: SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT PROTECT 
SMALL FAMILY FARMS IN DISASTERS? 
While many factors contribute to small farms struggling and 
going under in disasters, a thorough risk analysis leads one to 
conclude that these farms are worth saving. Current federal farm 
disaster aid does not ensure that small farms will continue to exist, 
perhaps in part because the public and policymakers have 
overlooked the value of these farms. This Part will demonstrate that 
family farms provide more economic value than is readily 
apparent. Furthermore, while financial factors are important, small 
farms are worth protecting from disaster loss because of the 
stability they bring to rural communities, their impact on socially 
vulnerable populations, and how they protect the environment and 
mitigate future disaster risk. 
A. Are Small Family Farms Economically Viable? 
Although it seems that small farms are becoming obsolete 
because they cannot financially keep up, a closer look shows that 
they may be more economically viable than large farms and worth 
protecting in disasters. Over the last fifty years the United States has 
undergone immense population growth and similar technological 
development. To keep up with population demand, agriculture 
 
concerns facing American farmers, an overlooked risk factor that affects their ability to run 
a successful enterprise.”). 
 117. Losing Your Nest Egg Can Kill You, SCIENCE DAILY (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www. 
sciencedaily.com/releases/2018/04/180403111113.htm (“A sudden loss of net worth in mid-
dle or older age is associated with a significantly higher risk of death, reports a new North-
western Medicine and University of Michigan study.”). 
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likewise developed new approaches to farming, and thus the 
“Green Revolution” was born. 
The Green Revolution changed the landscape of American farm-
ing. Using newly developed hybrid crops, fertilizers, pesticides, and 
cultivation methods, the Green Revolution dramatically increased 
crop and animal yields.118 
[B]etween 1950 and 2000, the average amount of milk produced 
per cow increased from 5,314 pounds to 18,201 pounds per year, 
the average yield of corn rose from 39 bushels to 153 bushels per 
acre, and each farmer in 2000 produced on average 12 times as 
much farm output per hour worked as a farmer did in 1950. The 
development of new technology was a primary factor in 
these improvements.119 
“Overall, the Green Revolution was a major success because it 
allowed for an unprecedented level of national food security, 
leading to a human population boom . . . .”120 And for decades gov-
ernment policies favored and encouraged this big farming 
approach. As Earl Butz, U.S. Secretary of Agriculture from 1971 to 
1976, famously said, “get big or get out” and “adapt or die.”121 Farm 
consolidation was a natural by-product of these developments. “In 
1935, there were 6.8 million farms in the United States with an 
average size of 155 acres. By 2002, there were only 2.1 million farms 
with an average size of 441 acres.”122 The total number of farms 
declined by 70%, but the amount of land in agricultural production 
stayed fairly constant as bigger farms purchased smaller farms that 
could not survive. 
Current federal farm disaster policies continue to favor cor-
porate farms over small farms under the assumption that this is the 
 
 118. Laurie Ristino & Gabriela Steier, Losing Ground: A Clarion Call for Farm Bill Reform 
to Ensure a Food Secure Future, 42 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 59, 84–85 (2016). 
 119. Id. (quoting KEITH O. FUGLIE ET AL., ECON. RESEARCH SERV., PRODUCTIVITY 
GROWTH IN U.S. AGRICULTURE 1 (2007)). 
 120. Shannon Avery Hughes, Global Sustainable Farming and the “SoCo” Soil Conservation 
Project, 45 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 431, 433 (2017). 
 121. William S. Eubanks II, A Rotten System: Subsidizing Environmental Degradation and 
Poor Public Health with Our Nation’s Tax Dollars, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 213, 228 (2009). 
 122. Id. at 228–29 (citation omitted). 
 
GOUGH_AA (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/19  8:30 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2018 
914 
most fiscally responsible approach.123 The federal Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (OMB) operates under the policy that a regulation 
is not promulgated “unless the potential benefit to society 
outweighs the potential cost.”124 Under OMB policy, corporate 
farms deserve federal protection because of the societal benefits 
from massive crop production. When natural disasters destroy 
small farms perhaps the overall economic benefit to society appears 
less than the minimal loss in production. Yet, when all the costs of 
corporate farming are accounted for, small family farms may 
actually be the most economical. 
Researchers across many disciplines are raising the alarm at the 
unsustainable low food prices resulting from corporate farming 
practices.125 Federal subsidies to corporate farms artificially lower 
food prices and hide the negative externalities.126 There are many 
costs to corporate farming that are not priced into what 
consumers pay. 
[E]very American pays for commodity crops five distinct times: 
(1) at the supermarket checkout, (2) with federal taxes that pre-
dominantly line the pockets of subsidized agribusiness, (3) with 
federal taxes for environmental cleanup costs paid by the 
government because of poor environmental protection standards 
in the Farm Bill, (4) through individualized medical costs linked 
to obesity, diabetes, asthma, malnutrition, hunger, and other 
illnesses caused by the Farm Bill, and (5) with additional federal 
taxes paid to collectively buttress healthcare programs such as 
Medicare, Medicaid, and emergency room care for patients of 
lower socioeconomic status who often fall ill as a result of the 
 
 123. See D. Lee Miller, A Seat at the Table: New Voices Urge Farm Bill Reform, 127 YALE 
L.J.F. 395, 400 (2017) (“Farm Bill policies support this consolidation through broad-based 
commodity programs and the federal crop insurance program.”). 
 124. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981). 
 125. See EMILE A. FRISON, INT’L PANEL OF EXPERTS ON SUSTAINABLE FOOD SYS., FROM 
UNIFORMITY TO DIVERSITY: A PARADIGM SHIFT FROM INDUSTRIAL AGRICULTURE TO DIVERSI-
FIED AGROECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS 18 (June 2016); SAVANNA HENDERSON ET AL., FOOD TANK, 
THE REAL COST OF FOOD: EXAMINING THE SOCIAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND HEALTH IMPACTS OF 
PRODUCING FOOD 6 (2015); York W. Bradshaw, Urbanization and Underdevelopment: A Global 
Study of Modernization, Urban Bias, and Economic Dependency, 52 AM. SOC. REV. 224, 236 (1987); 
Linda Breggin & D. Bruce Myers Jr., Subsidies with Responsibilities: Placing Stewardship and Dis-
closure Conditions on Government Payments to Large-Scale Commodity Crop Operations, 37 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 487, 490 (2013). 
 126. Tweeten, supra note 15, at 4. 
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Farm Bill-induced food system. It is only when the majority of 
American taxpayers and policymakers understand the true costs 
of industrial agriculture that the necessary changes can be made 
to fix the nation’s rotten agricultural system.127 
A thorough discussion of the negative externalities, their actual 
cost, and how much corporate farming practices contribute, is 
beyond the scope of this Note.128 Nevertheless, it is necessary to 
highlight a few and acknowledge that they are a very real problem. 
Some of the negative externalities attributed to corporate farms 
include water pollution, soil degradation, increased carbon emis-
sions, large fossil fuel consumption and reliance, limited food 
choices,129 increased obesity and higher medical costs,130 increased 
pesticide use and consumption,131 income disparity and more 
poverty, limited economic opportunities,132 increased antibiotic use 
and consumption, harm to third world countries,133 massive waste 
and odor issues,134 loss of market competition, and creation of a 
monopoly market.135 If corporate farms’ costs included a small 
portion of the negative externalities they create, small family farms 
would likely be “at least as efficient as larger commercial 
operations[,]”136 if not more efficient.137 Small family farms impose 
 
 127. Eubanks, supra note 121, at 239–40 (citation omitted). 
 128. Nicole E. Negowetti, Exposing the Invisible Costs of Commercial Agriculture: Shaping 
Policies with True Costs Accounting to Create a Sustainable Food Future, 51 VAL. U. L. REV. 
447 (2017). 
 129. See David Wallinga, Today’s Food System: How Healthy Is It?, 4 J. HUNGER & ENVTL. 
NUTRITION 251, 258–60 (2009). 
 130. Scott Fields, The Fat of the Land: Do Agricultural Subsidies Foster Poor Health?, 
112 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP., at A820 (2004), https://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/doi/pdf/10.1289 
/ehp.112-a820. 
 131. See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH SERV., EIB-98, AGRICULTURAL RESOUR-
CES AND ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS, 2012 EDITION 21 (Craig Osteen et al. eds., 2012) 
(admitting farmers spent $7.87 billion on millions of pounds of pesticides). 
 132. Alex E. Snyder, Note, Saving the Family Farm Through Federal Tax Policy: Easier Said 
Than Done, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 729, 732 (2005). 
 133. Ristino & Steier, supra note 118, at 65. 
 134. John Verheul, Methane as a Greenhouse Gas: Why the EPA Should Regulate Emissions 
from Animal Feeding Operations and Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations Under the Clean Air 
Act, 51 NAT. RESOURCES J. 163, 168 (2011). 
 135. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. NAT’L COMM’N ON SMALL FARMS, MP-1545, A TIME TO ACT 9 
(1998) [hereinafter TIME TO ACT]. 
 136. Willis L. Peterson, Are Large Farms More Efficient? 13 (Univ. of Minn. Dep’t of Applied 
Econ., Staff Paper P97-2, 1997). 
 137. TIME TO ACT, supra note 135, at 13. 
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fewer of these externalities for a variety of reasons. For example, 
they practice crop rotation, which produces a wider variety of 
crops, thereby providing an array of healthy food choices for con-
sumers and requiring fewer fertilizers because soil is less 
depleted.138 A more thorough analysis of the noneconomic factors 
that show small family farms merit more federal support will be 
discussed later. But purely from an economic standpoint, the gov-
ernment should do more to protect small farms from disaster loss. 
B. Value of the Small Family Farm to Rural Communities 
Small family farms are essential to much-needed rural commu-
nities and merit greater disaster protection. Farming is an impor-
tant part of America’s heritage. The Founding Fathers encouraged 
a “national agrarian identity.”139 Thomas Jefferson famously stated, 
“Cultivators of the earth are the most valuable citizens . . . and they 
are tied to their country and wedded to it’s [sic] liberty and interests 
by the most lasting bands.”140 Although America’s landscape has 
changed, rural communities are still valuable to this country. 
Rural communities represent a valuable population in our coun-
try that government programs seek to protect. Beginning in 1893, 
in response to urbanization, the government established projects to 
benefit rural communities and commissioned major reports on the 
needs of rural populations.141 These programs have expanded and 
evolved over the years but continue because of an acknowledged 
“value of rural communities as a basis for lifestyle concerns.”142 
Small family farms contribute to the economic health of rural 
communities, which necessitates greater disaster protection. Small 
family farms result in decentralized land ownership, which provides 
more employment opportunities in rural communities, increasing 
the overall economic health of the community.143 Lawmakers argue 
 
 138. Wender, supra note 54, at 163. 
 139. DENNIS KEENEY & LONI KEMP, THE INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POL’Y & THE MINNE-
SOTA PROJECT, A NEW AGRICULTURAL POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES 6 (2003). 
 140. Letter from Thomas Jefferson, U.S. Minister to Fr., to John Jay, U.S. Sec’y of Foreign 
Aff. (Aug. 23, 1785), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-08-02-0333. 
 141. 5 WEST’S FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE pt. 12, ch. 62, § 5703 (July 2018 
update) (“Background of Rural Development Policies”). 
 142. Id. at § 5701. 
 143. TIME TO ACT, supra note 135, at 13. 
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that farm subsidies “will trickle down to local economies, spurring 
growth. But as farms consolidate and become more mechanized, 
there are fewer jobs, especially for unskilled laborers.”144 Con-
versely, small farm owners rely on local businesses and services for 
their needs and “are more likely to have a stake in the well-being of 
the community and the well-being of its citizens.”145 When small 
farms collapse after disasters, it causes a rural exodus,146 and those 
left in the community “are trapped in a long, painful death spiral, 
plagued by poverty, crime and unemployment.”147 Keeping small 
farmers in rural communities makes sense from an economic 
perspective but requires greater federal support. 
The social, cultural, and environmental health of rural com-
munities relies heavily on small farms, and the federal government 
should do more to support them. “Connection to the land has 
always been central to the spiritual and cultural values of our 
country’s indigenous people.”148 Owners of small farms typically 
share their agricultural knowledge within the community, which 
promotes community vitality.149 Additionally, owners of small 
farms practice more regenerative farming practices, with fewer 
pesticides, and choose “specialty crops” (fruits and vegetables) 
over commodity crops (wheat, corn, soybeans), which enhances 
the physical and environmental health of the community.150 
As small farms fold in disasters and the communities around 
them are subsequently lost, a rich cultural heritage and tradition is 
lost as well. Social scientists evaluated the results of fifty-one 
studies spanning eight decades, documenting what links, if any, the 
transition from small farms to industrialized farming has on 
 
 144. Gilbert M. Gaul & Dan Morgan, A Slow Demise in the Delta, WASH. POST (June 20, 
2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/19/AR200706 
1902193.html. 
 145. TIME TO ACT, supra note 135, at 21. 
 146. Eubanks, supra note 121, at 231. 
 147. Gaul & Morgan, supra note 144. 
 148. TIME TO ACT, supra note 135, at 21. 
 149. Tyler Slack, Bridging the Gap: Farm Transition Challenges Facing Elder Farmers and the 
Need for a Nationwide Farm-On Program, 20 ELDER L.J. 485, 514 (2013). 
 150. Ristino & Steier, supra note 118, at 89–90. 
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communities.151 The results showed “[a]dverse impacts were found 
across an array of indicators measuring socioeconomic conditions, 
community social fabric, and environmental conditions. Few posi-
tive effects of industrialized farming were found across studies. 
The results demonstrate that public concern about industrialized 
farms is warranted.”152 Altogether, these social, cultural, and 
environmental losses are hard to evaluate in a traditional financial 
cost-benefit analysis but illustrate that rural communities need 
small farms. 
C. Loss of Small Family Farms and Impact on Vulnerable Populations 
Small family farms deserve greater disaster protection because 
losses within this group will unduly hurt already vulnerable 
populations. Small farms are disproportionately more likely to be 
operated by minorities, women, and the elderly.153 Furthermore, 
these farms operate with very small profit margins, if not at zero 
 
 151. Linda Lobao & Curtis W. Stofferahn, The Community Effects of Industrialized Farm-
ing: Social Science Research and Challenges to Corporate Farming Laws, 25 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES 
219, 219–20 (2008). 
 152. Id. at 219. 
 153. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ACH 12-3, 2012 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE HIGHLIGHTS: FARM 
DEMOGRAPHICS 2 (2014) [hereinafter 2012 CENSUS FARM DEMOGRAPHICS]. 
 
The number of women-operated farms grew more rapidly than that of men-operated farms 
in each sales class, but the overall rate of return on equity is -2.7% for women compared to 
1.4% for men. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ACH 12-12, 2012 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE HIGHLIGHTS: 
WOMEN FARMERS 1 (2014) [hereinafter 2012 CENSUS WOMEN FARMERS]. 
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sales.154 Without greater disaster protection, these farms will 
continue to suffer from systemically high exit numbers.155 
Women and minority farmers struggle to remain viable because 
of historical and current system inequalities. For decades, USDA 
policies excluded women and minority farmers and promulgated 
discriminatory practices against them.156 Additionally, current 
regulatory structure and policies continue to constrain these 
farmers’ abilities to make a living.157 USDA loans operate based on 
local committee decisions.158 Women and minorities are often shut 
out from accessing loans because the committees are comprised of 
a majority of white males.159 Furthermore, women and minority 
farmers typically have no opportunity to benefit from FCI subsidies 
because the subsidies cover mostly “commodity” crops (wheat, 
corn, and soybeans) while women and minority farmers tend to 
farm alternative food products.160 Similarly situated white men 
suffer less in disasters than minorities and women161 because of 
 
 154. Nathan A. Rosenberg, Farmers Who Don’t Farm: The Curious Rise of the Zero-Sales 
Farmer, J. AGRIC. FOOD SYS. & COMMUNITY DEV., Fall 2017, at 149, 152 (“In 2012, zero-sales 
operators were disproportionately likely to be minority and women.”). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Cassandra Jones Havard, African-American Farmers and Fair Lending: Racializing Rural 
Economic Space, 12 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 333, 334 (2001) (detailing USDA discrimination in 
farm policy); Guadalupe T. Luna, ”Women in Blue Jeans:” Connecting the Past with Agricultural 
Transformations in the Present, 23 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 313 (2008) (discussing the history 
of gender discrimination in farming); see Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C. 1999), 
aff’d, 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2000), and enforcement denied sub nom., Pigford v. Schafer, 536 
F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding racial discrimination by the USDA violated Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act and settlements authorized). 
 157. See Michèle Alexandre, We Reap What We Sow: Using Post-disaster Development Para-
digms to Reverse Structural Determinist Frameworks and Empower Small Farmers in Mississippi 
and Haiti, 14 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 135, 137 (2011). 
 158. Havard, supra note 156, at 334–35. 
 159. Gaul & Morgan, supra note 144 (“Nationally, there are 7,882 committee members, 
but just 90 of them are black. In Mississippi there are 236 committee members, only eight of 
whom are black.”). See generally Luna, supra note 156. 
 160. Eliza Barclay, Old McDonald Might Be a Lady: More Women Take Up Farming, NPR 
(June 13, 2013, 11:51 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2013/06/12/190982358 
/old-mcdonald-might-be-a-lady-more-women-take-up-farming (explaining that 72% of 
women’s agricultural sales were from specialty livestock and crops). 
 161. Cf. 2012 CENSUS WOMEN FARMERS, supra note 153, at 2. Women farmers usually 
rely on other sources of income to help cover costs. Id. Minority groups usually live in meager 
circumstances. 2012 CENSUS FARM DEMOGRAPHICS, supra note 153, at 3. 
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greater systemic support.162 For these reasons, these minority farm-
ers are placed in a vulnerable position with no protection when 
disaster strikes. 
Another vulnerable population, elderly farmers, also suffers 
disproportionately under current federal aid disaster policies. 
Currently, U.S. agriculture faces a troublesome age gap.163 In 2005, 
25% of all farmers (corporate and small farmers) were sixty-five or 
older, compared to only 3% of the overall labor force.164 Experts 
wonder who will provide crops as the older generation exits farm-
ing and no younger farmers replace them.165 Factors contributing to 
the age gap include lack of replenishment from a younger work 
force, inadequate savings for elderly farmers, no real buying 
market for elderly farmers’ real property, no employer-sponsored 
savings, lack of family successors, and less social security income.166 
These factors are more relevant to small family farmers than large 
corporate farms. Increased disaster support would incentivize 
younger farmers to enter the field, thus increasing the buying 
market and providing successors so the elderly farmers can retire. 
When elderly farmers exit the market after disasters, society 
suffers as well. The societal costs of elderly farmers leaving farming 
after disasters are three-fold: first, the loss from their farm output; 
second, the loss of knowledge and information to pass along to 
successors; and third, a lack of other farmers to fill the void. Limited 
federal support has a trickledown effect; fewer younger people 
enter the farming industry because the risks are too great.167 Thus, 
protecting this vulnerable population from disaster loss would 
provide many benefits. 
Vulnerable small farming populations deserve protection be-
cause they suffer greater loss, which in turn puts more of a burden 
 
 162. See Alexandre, supra note 157, at 140. For example, in the Mississippi Delta be-
tween 1920 and 1992, the number of black farmers decreased by 98% and the number of 
similarly situated white farmers only decreased by 65%. Id. at 142. 
 163. TIME TO ACT, supra note 135, at 89. 
 164. Slack, supra note 149, at 486 (citing Ashok K. Mishra et al., How Do U.S. Farmers Plan 
for Retirement?, 3 AMBER WAVES 13, 13–18 (2005)). Elder farmers make up over half of farms 
in poverty. 2014 FAMILY FARM REPORT, supra note 19, at 48. 
 165. Slack, supra note 149, at 490; TIME TO ACT, supra note 135, at 89. 
 166. Slack, supra note 149, at 490–99. 
 167. See Karin R. Zeigler, Note, Who Will Teach Our Farmers: Learning the Value of Mentor 
Programs from State and Private Programs, 5 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 279, 280 (2000). 
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on society. These groups tend to be at or below poverty levels and 
have less education.168 The USDA has attempted to reach out to 
these groups through the USDA Minority Farm Register; tax 
changes; the Women, Food and Agriculture Network; and changes 
in census-data gathering to recognize and track these groups.169 But 
additional work still needs to be done. As Charles Fluharty, director 
of the Rural Policy Research Institute said, “The policy choice that 
Congress has made is so stark . . . . You see the effects [of disasters 
on farmers] in lots of poor rural communities. But the tragedy is 
exacerbated in the minority communities.”170 With little education 
and federal support, these groups often lose their self-reliance and 
instead rely on society to support them after a disaster. A federal 
support network established prior to disasters would limit the need 
for even more substantial support after. 
D. The Environmentally Responsible Choice: 
Small Farms or Corporate Farms? 
Small farms merit more disaster protection because, regardless 
of the approach of analyzing risk in an environmental context, it is 
evident small farms cause less harm. All farming inevitably affects 
the environment and future generations. But small farms practice 
environmentally sustainable farming techniques, create a smaller 
carbon footprint, and minimize environmental harms that contri-
bute to future disasters. A pure “risk versus risk” comparison 
creates a clear picture of the harms of industrialized farming and a 
valid argument for greater protection of small farms in disasters. 
 
 168. 2014 FAMILY FARM REPORT, supra note 19, at 23, 45–47; see also Socially Disadvantaged 
Farmers: Race, Hispanic Origin, and Gender, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH SERV. https:// 
www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-economy/beginning-disadvantaged-farmers/socially-dis 
advantaged-farmers-race-hispanic-origin-and-gender/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2018). 
 169. See Luna, supra note 156, at 335 (“Until recently, the census limited population 
studies to male spouses as the principal operator.”); see also Minority and Socially Disadvan-
taged Farmers Assistance, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FARM SERV. AGENCY, https://www.fsa.usda.gov 
/about-fsa/structure-and-organization/office-of-the-administrator/office-of-civil-rights 
/minority-and-socially-disadvantaged-farmers-assistance/index (last visited Oct. 16, 2018). 
 170. Gaul & Morgan, supra note 144. 
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1. Environmental damage of small and large farms 
Small family farms should receive more federal disaster 
protection because they create less environmental risk. The current 
crop insurance subsidy program offers coverage to farms for either 
“growing commodity crops on their land or . . . shifting cropland 
into conservation programs. . . .”171 Both options induce perverse 
incentives. Since insurance payouts are determined by production, 
and not just from weather-related loss but also revenue loss, farms 
are incentivized to mass produce (sometimes with double planting) 
without regard to quality or sustainability.172 These farms tend to 
rely on Green Revolution hybrid crops,173 which supply higher 
yields but only when saturated with water, chemical fertilizers, and 
toxic pesticides.174 Thus, industrial farmers pump the soil and crops 
with water and chemicals (or antibiotics if livestock farms)175 to 
increase output and subsidy payments. Further, livestock farms 
cram as many bodies as they can in limited space to increase output, 
causing more environmental damage. The “conservation” option to 
receive subsidies, which in theory appears to protect the envi-
ronment, requires nothing more than leaving a field fallow for a 
season to receive payments.176 Neither option adequately protects 
the environment. 
Small farmers typically practice more environmentally friendly 
techniques without receiving federal subsidies. Because small 
farmers tend to live on or near the land they farm, it is important to 
them to cultivate their lands using sustainable practices since “they 
 
 171. Eubanks, supra note 121, at 247. 
 172. See Wender, supra note 54, at 159–64. 
 173. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ACH 12-26, 2012 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE HIGHLIGHTS: 
FAMILY FARMS 4 (2015) [hereinafter 2012 CENSUS FAMILY FARMS] (“Fifty-eight percent of 
midsize family farms and 55 percent of large family farms specialized in oilseed and grain 
production in 2012.”). 
 174. See Miller, supra note 123, at 400. 
 175. Kaitlyn Trout, Note, You Can’t Have Your Beef and Eat It Too: The Statutory Effect of 
Anti-corporate Farming Acts on Family Farms and Beef Corporations, 39 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 
513, 531 (“Because feedlots receive cattle from a variety of sources that travel long distance 
on various freights, feedlots must over-vaccinate in hopes of maintaining the cattle’s health.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 176. FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE PROGRAM OVERVIEW 2018, supra note 45, at 12. This 
document highlights conservation measures recently enacted to increase environmen-
tal protections. 
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are continuously exposed to environmental hazards present.”177 
They usually farm non-commodity crops,178 because those crops do 
not deplete the soil as much, and rotate crops from year to year to 
protect soil nutrients and limit erosion; the crop rotation also 
decreases the huge demand for fertilizers. “Farming is a way of life 
for them rather than just a way of making money, so small family 
farmers are motivated to raise their crops and animals in the most 
environmentally sound and healthy way.”179 Generally, non-
commodity crops and sustainable practices do not qualify for 
federal subsidies under crop insurance.180 
“The federal crop insurance program is not a safety net, but a 
thinly veiled federal subsidy rewarding destructive behavior.”181 
All farming can hurt the environment through air pollution, soil 
erosion, excessive water usage, and chemical pollution. In high-
income countries, “agricultural pollution has already overtaken 
contamination from settlements and industries as the major factor 
in the degradation of [water].”182 Similar statistics exist for air 
pollution and soil damage.183 But these risks dramatically increase 
with large corporate farms. Crop insurance provides perverse in-
centives by uncoupling food costs from the negative environmental 
externalities large-scale food production creates. As the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations so succinctly said, 
“policies need to be coherent. Interventions aimed at increasing 
food production and farm income on one hand and at mitigating 
pollution . . . should be mutually supportive—or at least not 
conflicting . . . .”184 Large corporate farms would prefer to avoid the 
costs and pass them on to society “in the form of water and soil 
 
 177. Wender, supra note 54, at 143 (“These farmers and their families breathe in chemi-
cals, smell the waste, and drink the polluted water.”). 
 178. 2012 CENSUS FAMILY FARMS, supra note 173, at 3. Of small farms, only 14% had 
oilseed and grain production as their top commodity. Id. 
 179. Wender, supra note 54, at 143. 
 180. While increased attention has been given to legislating incentives for more sustain-
able farming practices, these have yet to cover much ground. For a more detailed analysis, 
see William S. Eubanks II, The Future of Federal Farm Policy: Steps for Achieving a More 
Sustainable Food System, 37 VT. L. REV. 957 (2013). 
 181. Ristino & Steier, supra note 118, at 107. 
 182. JAVIER MATEO-SAGASTA ET AL., FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., WATER 
POLLUTION FROM AGRICULTURE: A GLOBAL REVIEW 2 (2017). 
 183. Id. at 19–20. 
 184. Id. at 22. 
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pollution.”185 Recognizing that corporate farms create a larger envi-
ronment risk, disaster legislation should reflect that by protecting 
farming practices that are sustainable. 
2. Effects on climate change: small vs. corporate 
Compared to industrial farms, small farms substantially limit 
the carbon footprint created by farming. Climate change is increas-
ingly becoming the largest environmental issue,186 with potential 
consequences that include future warming, increased frequency of 
heat waves, increased heavy precipitation in some areas, increased 
droughts, more intense tropical storms, and increased incidence of 
high sea level.187 Moreover, climate change is increasingly linked to 
industrialized farming for two reasons: methane emissions and 
fossil fuel use.188 
Methane gas emissions naturally occur from all livestock farms, 
but the risk is enhanced on corporate farms. Methane gas is “many 
times more potent than CO2” and “is responsible for nearly as much 
climate change as all other non-CO2 gases put together.”189 Methane 
emissions result from cattle waste, but emissions are growing 
disproportionately fast because of commercial farms’ Concentrated 
Animal Feeding Operations (CAFO).190 CAFO house large numbers 
 
 185. TIME TO ACT, supra note 135, at 15. 
 186. Mary Jane Angelo, Corn, Carbon, and Conservation: Rethinking U.S. Agricultural 
Policy in a Changing Global Environment, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 593, 599–600 (2010) (“[G]lobal 
climatic changes will occur that will make all other environmental crises pale 
in comparison.”). 
 187. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: 
SYNTHESIS REPORT 53 (2015), https://archive.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR 
_AR5_FINAL_full_wcover.pdf. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change report, it is “[v]irtually certain” (>99% probability of occurrence) that future 
warming will occur, “extremely likely” (>90% probability) that heat waves and heavy 
precipitation will become more frequent, and “likely” (>66% probability) that there will be 
an increase in droughts and more intense tropical storms. Id. at 10, 51, 72. 
 188. Id. at 4–5; Verheul, supra note 134, at 168. 
 189. Verheul, supra note 134, at 164 (citing Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 
U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse 
-gas-emissions (last visited Nov. 15, 2018)). 
 190. Verheul, supra note 134, at 168–69; see also Overview of Greenhouse Gases: Methane 
Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/overview 
-greenhouse-gases (last visited Nov. 15, 2018) (“Methane emissions in the United States 
decreased by 16 percent between 1990 and 2016. During this time period, emissions 
increased from sources associated with agricultural activities, while emissions decreased 
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of cattle in small spaces.191 Because cattle in CAFO are fed corn 
rather than grass, their waste cannot be used as a natural ferti-
lizer.192 Thus, their waste has no use and is stored in a holding area 
or “waste lagoon.”193 The waste sits and ferments in these lagoons 
for extended periods of time causing large increases of methane 
emissions: “Since 1990, the methane emitted from lagoons has 
increased nearly 31 percent.”194 In contrast, small family farms 
are more self-sustaining. They typically feed their cattle grass 
and use the waste as a fertilizer for other fields, limiting meth-
ane emissions.195 
Farming’s dependence on fossil fuels continues to increase due 
to government policies that support a shift from human energy to 
fossil fuel energy. The United States’ current industrial farming 
policies, incentivizing output over quality, “are almost entirely 
fossil fuel dependent.”196 As the food policy expert Michael Pollan 
famously stated, “when we eat from the industrial-food system, we 
are eating oil.”197 
A snapshot view of industrial agriculture . . . easily supports that 
view: (1) nitrogen fertilizers, “the backbone of high-yield in-
dustrial agriculture,” are synthesized from natural gas and con-
sume approximately 30% of the energy used in U.S. agriculture; 
(2) gasoline or diesel powered tractors till the land and spread 
seeds; (3) electricity is constantly used to power irrigation pumps 
and laser-guided farm equipment; (4) gasoline or diesel powered 
combines collect the crops during harvest; (5) the crops are driven, 
usually by diesel powered trucks, to a feedlot or processing plant 
across the country; (6) the processing plant uses large amounts of 
electricity to turn the crops into a television dinner or snack food; 
 
from sources associated with landfills, coal mining, and the exploration through distribution 
of natural gas and petroleum products.”). 
 191. 40 C.F.R. § 122.23 (2018). For the purposes of this paper, when I reference CAFOs 
I use the EPA’s definition as used in the cited regulation. 
 192. Verheul, supra note 134, at 168. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 169 (citing U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DOCUMENTATION FOR EMISSIONS OF 
GREENHOUSE GASES IN THE UNITED STATES 2008, at 1, 31 (2008), https://www.eia.gov 
/environment/archive/1605/ggrpt/documentation/pdf/0638(2008).pdf. 
 195. Verheul, supra note 134, at 168. 
 196. Wender, supra note 54, at 158. 
 197. Michael Pollan, Farmer in Chief, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Oct. 9, 2008), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2008/10/12/magazine/12policyt.html?_r=1&%20pagewanted=1. 
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and (7) diesel powered trucks drive the food items to their final 
destinations.198 
Consequently, industrial agriculture accounts for about 20% of 
U.S. fossil fuel consumption but only 6% of national gross domestic 
product.199 Small family farms do contribute to fossil fuel use in the 
same way as large corporate farms. Nevertheless, even when 
scaling for size, small farms use fewer fertilizers, less electricity for 
water needs, and less gas for transportation because their environ-
mentally friendly farming practices require less. 
Small family farms are the more responsible choice when look-
ing at climate change contribution. Government subsidies incenti-
vizing corporate farms and protecting them in disasters may 
actually be counterproductive because of the increased risk they 
pose to climate change. In contrast, increased federal disaster aid 
to small family farms would ensure more sustainable food pro-
duction practices. 
3. Future disaster mitigation 
Small farms do more to mitigate future disaster risk, and 
legislation should strive to support these practices. Farming is 
dependent upon nature, yet farming is also a key contributor to 
environmental harm. Some of the sustainable farming practices 
small farms utilize limit future disaster risks. This is true from small 
disasters to the catastrophic. Two examples of disasters provide 
context for understanding why federal aid supporting small farms 
in disasters can mitigate future disaster risk. 
Industrial farming contributes to and causes flooding disasters 
in a way that small farming techniques do not. In July 2017, the 
National Weather Service issued flood warnings for south-central, 
southeast, and east-central Wisconsin.200 Storm damage eventually 
 
 198. Eubanks, supra note 121, at 269. 
 199. Id.; Agriculture and Its Related Industries Added over $1 Trillion to U.S. GDP in 2016, 
U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH SERV., https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/chart 
-gallery/gallery/chart-detail/?chartId=88969 (last visited Nov. 15, 2018). 
 200. Severe Thunderstorms and Flash Flooding of July 19–20, 2017, NAT’L WEATHER SERV., 
https://www.weather.gov/arx/jul1917 (last visited Nov. 15, 2018). 
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caused about $8.3 million in infrastructure costs.201 In an area 
already susceptible to flooding, industrial farming has increased 
the risk and harm from flooding. To support CAFO, between 1987 
and 2007 approximately 84% of agricultural land in Wisconsin 
switched from alfalfa and other grasses to row crops like corn and 
soybeans.202 Predominantly grown by Wisconsin industrial farms, 
these commodity crops “provide less groundcover in the winter 
months and increase runoff from fields in the spring months.”203 
Even though the land remains in use as “green space,” the change 
in usage increases flooding occurrences and damage costs in this 
region. Future flood risk in the area led the USDA to create a flood-
plain easement program that restricts certain plots of agricultural 
land from being used for commodity crops.204 Small farms naturally 
mitigate these disasters because they use groundcover and crop 
rotation, which increase absorption and limit massive runoff dur-
ing heavy rains. 
Industrial farming also contributes to catastrophic natural 
disasters from which recovery may not be possible. Dead zones are 
oxygen-depleted water areas that kill marine life and decrease fish 
reproduction in surrounding areas. In nature, dead zones occur 
infrequently and on a small scale. But fertilizer-contaminated 
runoff from industrial farms has made this a natural disaster 
experts fear could lead to widespread fish shortages and cause the 
whole fishing industry to suffer.205 In 2017, the largest U.S. dead 
zone in the Gulf of Mexico grew to match New Jersey in size, and 
studies conclusively linked the growth to industrial farm fertilizer 
 
 201. Katie Delong, WI Emergency Management: Flooding Caused $8.3M in Damage to Infra-
structure in Kenosha, Racine, Walworth, FOX 6 (July 23, 2017, 8:29 PM), http://fox6now.com 
/2017/07/23/wi-emergency-management-flooding-caused-8-3m-in-damage-to-infrastruc 
ture-in-kenosha-racine-walworth/. 
 202. CAROLYN KOUSKY ET AL., RES. FOR THE FUTURE, THE ROLE OF LAND USE IN 
ADAPTATION TO INCREASED PRECIPITATION AND FLOODING: A CASE STUDY IN WISCONSIN’S 
LOWER FOX RIVER BASIN 10–11 (2011), http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages 
/Download/RFF-Rpt-Kousky%20etal%20GreatLakes%20(2).pdf. 
 203. Id. at 11. 
 204. Id. at 40. 
 205. Denise Breitburg et al., Declining Oxygen in the Global Ocean and Coastal Waters, 
359 SCIENCE 1, 4–6 (Jan. 5, 2018) (finding that ocean dead zones have expanded 1000% 
worldwide since 1950). 
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runoff.206 Small farmers protect their soil through crop rotation and 
groundcover rather than depleting and rebuilding artificially 
through fertilizers. This means there is less erosion, water runoff, 
and fertilizer pollution. 
Harm from disasters is better mitigated by small family farm 
practices than industrial farms. Even if the harm seems unlikely, 
disaster mitigation is about planning for the low-probability, high-
consequence disasters that often do not merit attention. But these 
harms should merit attention due to potential severe consequences. 
Industrial farms engage in many activities that show potential for 
severe consequences. Current federal crop insurance subsidies 
condone these practices. By providing greater support to small 
farms, the government also mitigates against future disasters. 
IV. POSSIBLE LEGISLATIVE FIXES 
Incremental changes to current legislation can provide small 
farms more protection in disasters. Suggestions include caps on 
payouts, graduated subsidies and increased coverage for addi-
tional crops, and subsidies for sustainable farming techniques. Not 
only will these changes help small farms in disasters but also 
mitigate many previously mentioned risk factors. 
A. Payment Caps 
Payment caps on federal crop insurance payouts limit taxpayer 
costs, protect small farms from monopolies, help rural communities 
remain viable, and protect green space. Federal crop insurance 
determines payouts based on prior years’ revenue and anticipated 
income from current planting. Under this system, industrial farms 
stand to receive large payouts. Further, crop insurance provides 
revenue protection payouts even when farms receive income if the 
income is below anticipated insured levels.207 This incentivizes 
industrial farms to insure to the maximum amount, taking 
 
 206. LUCIA VON REUSNER, MIGHTY EARTH, MYSTERY MEAT II: THE INDUSTRY BEHIND THE 
QUIET DESTRUCTION OF THE AMERICAN HEARTLAND 6 (2017), http://www.mightyearth.org 
/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Meat-Pollution-in-America.pdf; Gulf of Mexico ‘Dead Zone’ 
Is the Largest Ever Measured, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (Aug. 2, 2017), https:// 
www.noaa.gov/media-release/gulf-of-mexico-dead-zone-is-largest-ever-measured. 
 207. 11 COUCH ON INSURANCE pt. VI, subpt. C, § 155:101 (3d ed., Dec. 2018 update) 
(“Crop Damage or Insufficiency,” authored by Steven Plitt et al.). 
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advantage of the subsidized premiums and benefiting doubly at 
taxpayers’ expense, thus externalizing costs. Limiting payouts 
leads corporate farms to formally assess risk and purchase crop 
insurance as needed rather than unnecessarily purchasing as an 
opportunity for double income. 
Creating payment caps limits federal promulgation of large 
farms, allows that money to be allocated to other subsidies, and 
gives small farms room to exist in the market.208 Without payment 
caps, large payments are going to the farms that are already 
significantly better off. Indeed, under this system large farms can 
continue to expand and monopolize the market.209 Rather than 
contributing to a market monopoly, caps would somewhat equalize 
the system. While large farms will continue to have more income, 
payment caps protect from a windfall, allowing them to maintain 
status quo while limiting consolidation. 
Less consolidation results in two major benefits. Small farms 
can remain to support rural communities, providing jobs, pre-
serving a cultural connection to the land, and helping ensure small 
farming techniques endure within the community. Moreover, 
less consolidation provides better green space. Techniques used 
on small farms limit water and fertilizer runoff problems, thus 
protecting the environment and mitigating the risk of 
future disasters.210 
B. Graduated Subsidies and Increased Crop Coverage 
Crop insurance with graduated subsidies based on the income 
and equity of the farm would provide a way to increase subsidies 
for small farmers and cover additional crops. The current flat 
subsidy of 62% is applied equally to million-dollar farming 
corporations and small farmers with $10,000 a year in income. 
Proponents for the current system hold that it is “fair” for crop 
 
 208. BEKKERMAN ET AL., supra note 48, at 4–10; see Snyder, supra note 132, at 731–32. 
 209. Eubanks, supra note 121, at 233 (“[S]ince the wealthiest corporations receive double 
compensation by both securing the largest profits through sales and acquiring the largest 
governmental subsidies based on their yields, they are apt to monopolize the market and 
push smaller competitors to the wayside.”). 
 210. See Benjamin Bryce & Robert Skousen, Bloomin’ Disaster: Externalities, Commons 
Tragedies, and the Algal Bloom Problem, 21 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 11, 21–22 (2017). 
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insurance to be “size neutral.”211 But many argue that the lack of 
adjustment in subsidies is a significant loophole that should 
be addressed.212 
If the government is in the business of insurance, it should at-
tempt to be more economically viable by implementing financially 
responsible methods. Most private insurance programs adjust rates 
based on risk, income, equity, and other factors. Risk can continue 
to be evaluated by region, and possible payout amount, and then 
can be incorporated into the subsidy rate. Small farms, which incur 
a small payout and create small risks for insurance companies 
when compared with large corporate farms, would qualify for 
lower insurance rates. Equalizing insurance payments to reflect the 
possible risk is a better approach to protect small farms. By giving 
large farms smaller subsidies, smaller farms can benefit from larger 
subsidies, and the cost remains the same to taxpayers. 
Limiting subsidies to industrial farms also allows federal crop 
insurance to provide subsidies for additional “specialty crops.” 
Currently, “[f]armers [receiving subsidies] are not completely free 
to plant what they want. In general, producers seeking subsidies 
for ‘covered commodities’ may not plant fruits or vegetables on 
base acres.”213 Subsidies for specialty crops, such as fruits and 
vegetables, would allow greater access to crop insurance for small 
farmers. Moreover, this would provide more security to vulnerable 
groups who farm these crops in greater numbers. Industrial farms 
could also use these subsidies to diversify and rotate crops, thus 
improving soil quality. Finally, the public would benefit from 
 
 211. Barrett Kirwan, Professor, Univ. of Ill. at Urbana-Champaign, Address at the 
Agricultural and Applied Economics Association 2014 Annual Meeting: The Crowd-Out 
Effect of Crop Insurance on Farm Survival and Profitability (July 27, 2014). 
 212. Susan Du, Small Farmers Say that Even with Crop Insurance, the 1% Just Gets Richer, 
CITY PAGES (Mar. 12, 2018), http://www.citypages.com/news/small-farmers-say-that-even 
-with-crop-insurance-the-1-just-gets-richer/476593873 (“Because there is no cap on the sub-
sidies, the wealthiest one percent commandeer an outsized portion of public funds.”); 
Johnathan Hladik, Crop Insurance Subsidies in Serious Need of Reform, INSIDESOURCES (May 5, 
2017), https://www.insidesources.com/crop-insurance-subsidies-serious-need-reform; Path 
to the 2018 Farm Bill: Crop Insurance Modernization, NAT’L SUSTAINABLE AGRIC. COAL. (Dec. 6, 
2017), http://sustainableagriculture.net/blog/path-to-2018-farm-bill-crop-insurance (“Ad-
ditionally, the program [Federal Crop Insurance] provides subsidy support without any per 
farm limit and with little transparency, which allows some of the largest and wealthiest 
farms to grow larger and wealthier at the expense of other farmers and the taxpayer.”). 
 213. Alexandre, supra note 157, at 152 (internal quotations omitted). 
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greater access to a variety of healthy foods and reduced health-
care costs.214 
C. Subsidies for Sustainable Techniques 
Providing greater subsidies for sustainable techniques rewards 
small farms for healthy farming methods, incentivizes industrial 
farms to implement better practices, and protects from environ-
mental concerns. The only conservation technique currently linked 
to federal crop insurance subsidies is when farmers leave a field 
fallow.215 While this practice does give the soil a chance to rest, it 
also increases erosion when not coupled with groundcover or other 
revitalizing techniques. Small farmers who “cultivate their lands 
using sustainable agricultural methods solely for the protection of 
the ecological cycle that is vital to producing a high quality, 
nutritional crop . . . . typically receive no federal funding despite 
their sustainable practices because [federal] . . . conservation 
programs are targeted primarily towards megafarms.”216 For 
conservation efforts to be successful, Congress should link 
insurance payment subsidies to farming practices.217 This would 
force farmers to face the actual costs of negative farming techniques 
and reward sustainable techniques, many already embraced by 
small farmers.218 
V. CONCLUSION 
Small farms are a vital part of the U.S. economy yet are 
unprotected in disasters and left to suffer disproportionately more 
loss. Greater federal protection through the Federal Crop Insurance 
 
 214. Id. at 156 (“[B]enefits, such as grants of subsidies to small farmers and the promo-
tion of healthy crops, could also greatly benefit governments and individuals by helping to 
reduce the cost of health care.”). 
 215. See Breggin & Myers, supra note 125, at 487 (explaining current crop insurance 
conservation subsidies and offering more responsible, effective options). 
 216. Eubanks, supra note 121, at 247–48. 
 217. Ristino & Steier, supra note 118, at 105–06. 
 218. Many articles address this option in greater detail. For a more thorough discussion 
see Angelo, supra note 186; Christopher Frump, Note, Up to Our Ears: Corn Overproduction, 
Its Environmental Toll, and Using the 2012 U.S. Farm Bill to Limit Corn Subsidies, Increase 
Environmental Protection Incentives, and Place Accountability on Crop Operations, 8 FLA. A&M U. 
L. REV. 419, 420 (2013). 
 
GOUGH_AA (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/19  8:30 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2018 
932 
Program would allow small farms to remain viable entities and, in 
doing so, protect rural communities, vulnerable populations, and 
environmental health. This subset of farms represents the “corner-
stone of our agricultural and rural economy”219 and deserves a 
federal safety net for when disaster strikes. 
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